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Abstract 
 
Although Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes’s macroeconomics and essential message 
clashes with authoritative alternative interpretations, it has become increasingly influential 
during the years following the Global Financial Crisis, even in mainstream circles. This paper 
offers a critical evaluation of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis from the perspective 
of the alternative Austro-Wicksellian paradigm. Although some of the similarities and/or 
analogies between Minsky’s approach and that of the Austrian School suggest a more than 
merely superficial affinity between the two theoretical frameworks and although some scope 
for cross-fertilization between both approaches can be found, both theoretically and 
empirically, at a fundamental conceptual level both theories remain incompatible and 
difficult if not impossible to reconcile, in particular in terms of fundamental causality and in 
terms of policy conclusions and prescriptions.  Despite the fact that Minsky’s policy 
conclusions are multifaceted and somewhat eclectic, they manifest a lack of familiarity with 
the conclusions of the Austrian analysis of the problems of central planning by Big Players 
such as Big Bank and Big Government. Both approaches also offer contrasting interpretations 
of the historical experience of the Global Financial Crisis. 
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1. Introduction: the Global Financial Crisis and Heterodox Macroeconomics 
 
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis (hereafter GFC) and the subsequent Great 
Recession a widespread perception has prevailed that orthodox economics proved useless in 
predicting, tackling or even imagining the biggest financial debacle in the world’s most 
advanced economies for eighty years and that this fact constitutes clear evidence of a 
systemic failure of the economics profession. (Colander et al. 2011; Kates 2010, 2011; 
Rodriguez et al. 2014; Wolf 2014)(1)  
According to Minsky, economics should include the possibility of severe crises, not 
as the result of external shocks, but as events that emerge from within the system. Crises, 
according to Minsky, have proved a persistent feature of capitalist economies. Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis (hereafter FIH) is a model of a capitalist economy which does 
not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity: the 
hypothesis contends that historical business cycles are compounded out of the internal 
dynamics of capitalist economies as well as out of the system of interventions and regulations 
designed to keep the economy operating within reasonable bounds. (Minsky 1994 [2012] 
547)(2) 
No less pertinent has been the approach of economists of the Austrian School in 
explaining and understanding the events leading up to the GFC and the following economic 
recession. (Cachanosky and Salter 2013) It has not always been clearly perceived, however, 
whether the post-Keynesian and Austrian accounts are complementary, partly complementary 
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and partly incompatible, or entirely incompatible.(3) 
              At least one author has suggested that both approaches are complementary rather 
than incompatible. Writing about the financial crisis, Leijonhufvud (2009, 742) indeed 
observes: 
 
“Operating an interest targeting regime keying on the consumer price index (CPI), the Fed 
was lured into keeping interest rates far too low for far too long. The result was inflation of 
asset prices combined with a general deterioration of credit quality (….). This, of course, 
does not make a Keynesian story. Rather, it is a variation on the Austrian overinvestment (or 
malinvestment) theme. But Mises and Hayek had very little to say about the financial side of 
an overinvestment boom that is of interest to us 80 years later. For a thorough analysis of 
that subject one has to turn to Human Minsky.” 
 
Resolving this issue in greater detail requires taking a closer look at the specifics of 
the respective theories. A critical attempt will therefore here be made not only to analyze 
apparent analogies as well as divergences between both approaches, but also to suggest a few 
lines of possible future research by indicating areas where some cross-fertilization between 
both approaches or even a partial theoretical integration of both theories seems possible.(4)  
 
2. Setting the Scene: Keynes, Minsky, and the Austrian School 
 
2.a. Keynes versus the Austrian School 
 
              The Hayek/Keynes debate, which is conventionally dated to have begun with 
Hayek’s two-part review of Keynes’ Treatise on Money, was at least in part a continuation of 
19th controversies concerning the role of saving, public spending, private investment, and 
budget deficits. (Hayek 1931-2; Keynes 1930 [2011]; O’Driscoll 2011) Although there is 
little evidence from contemporary debates on these issues that the monetary debates of the 
19th and 20th centuries ever took place (O’Driscoll ibid. 36), and although most of the 
recently emerging models have come from a more or less “Keynesian” perspective, it has 
been argued that an alternative “Hayekian” path might be taken and that Austrian approaches 
to macroeconomics are now more likely to resonate with mainstream economists than in 
years past.  (Koppl and Luther 2012; Cachanosky and Salter 2013) 
              Recently attempts have been made to link Austrian and Keynesian economics by 
integrating the time structure of production and the Hayekian triangles with the Keynesian 
consumption function as drawn from the Samuelsonian “neo-classical synthesis”. (Garrison 
1978; Skousen 2015) Although this approach has become a recurring theme in part of the 
Austrian literature, this construction can be questioned on the ground that, as is well known, 
several interpretations of Keynes’ General Theory exist as well as major differences between 
interpreters about the meaning of the book and its central message. Since the GFC it has 
become increasingly doubtful whether the “neo-classical synthesis” adequately captures the 
essence of Keynes’ intended message. From this perspective the Skousen-Garrison 
construction is perhaps more a Hayek-Samuelson synthesis than a Hayek-Keynes synthesis! 
               A more fertile conceptual framework for studying dynamically unsustainable 
processes is provided by Wicksell’s (1936 [1965]) model of cumulative expansions and 
contractions, which was taken over by a large number of economists in the early twentieth 
century; both Hayek, in his business cycle model, and Keynes, in his Treatise on Money are 
to be mentioned in this context. Indeed the so-called Wicksell Connection—or Austro-
Wicksellian Connection—has been held responsible for a fundamental convergence of the 
respective theories of Hayek and Keynes about money, capital, and the business cycle during 
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the course of the 1930s. This affinity effectively ended thereafter, however, and the Wicksell 
Connection is largely absent from modern mainstream macro. (Goodspeed 2012)(5) 
 
2.b. Keynes versus Minsky 
 
               Post-Keynesian economists distinguish themselves by two characteristics: among 
interpreters of Keynes’ work they are the most active group emphasizing expectations and 
uncertainty as the driving force in the General Theory, and they combine this emphasis with 
intense concentration on their own choice of a favorite chapter, Chapter 17—“The Essential 
Properties of Interest and Money”— and on the role of money in “finance.” (Meltzer 1988, 
285) Minsky is no exception. Minsky believes, however, that Keynes’ discussion in Chapter 
17, though perceptive, is flawed because Keynes does not explicitly introduce liability 
structures and the payment commitments they entail.(Minsky 1975 [2008]) Therefore Minsky 
describes his task as follows: 
 
“In order to bring out the power of the ideas involved, we will undertake to adjust the 
argument of chapter 17 by explicitly considering liability structures and by setting the 
argument in a cyclical and speculative framework. As modified by these considerations, the 
argument of chapter 17 gives us the ingredients for an explanation of a speculative 
investment boom and of why such a boom contains, in the development of a crisis-prone 
setup, the seeds of its own destruction. “(ibid. 77) 
 
                  It has been argued that Minsky was not the interpreter of Keynes that he supposed 
himself to be and that his FIH must be considered as an extension or a reformulation, and not 
an “interpretation”, of Keynes. Much like the Austrian theory, Minsky’s theory is indeed a 
theory of the upper turning point. Keynes’ perplexities instead focus on the lower turning 
point. Minsky “combats” the upswing, Keynes the downswing. (De Antoni 2010) Although 
Minsky’s cyclical rereading of The General Theory clashes with authoritative alternative 
interpretations, he seems to have believed that his own interpretation is most faithful to the 
true vision and message of Keynes. 
 
2.c. Minsky versus the Austrian School 
 
                 The idea of a boom containing “the seeds of its own undoing (or destruction)” is 
indeed also very characteristic of typical formulations of the Austrian theory of boom and 
bust. The impression that Minsky’s interpretation of the General Theory thus yields a variant 
of Keynesian business cycle theorizing not unlike and in some respects even analogous to the 
Austrian theory is not entirely mistaken. Nevertheless this observation is subject to some 
qualifications and reservations. In fact, despite certain similarities and analogies, especially 
concerning the role of money and banking institutions in the context of the business cycle, 
and despite Minsky’s providing what is clearly a cyclical reading of the General Theory, his 
work does not fit very well into the framework of the Wicksell Connection. 
A central element of the Wicksell Connection relates to the identification of inter-
temporal coordination and the role of the interest-rate mechanism in this respect as the most 
important problem in macroeconomics. Although Minsky’s analysis confirms the standard 
negative relationship between investment and the interest rate, in his scheme interest rates 
play a secondary role. Dominating the scene are the other determinants of investment, in 
particular profit expectations and confidence. Austrians do not reject theorizing about the role 
of confidence or “animal spirits” per se but argue that we need to look more carefully at the 
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way in which Big Players in the economic system can affect confidence as a result of their 
dominance.(Koppl 2014, 130-1) The view that will be held here is thus that Minsky’s 
Wicksellian pedigree is somewhat doubtful.(6)  
           Minsky took inspiration from Fisher’s debt-deflation theory which clearly influenced 
his own debt-deflation theory. (Fisher 1933; Minsky 1986 [2008] 192) Minsky’s debt-
deflation theory emphasizes the role of the asset market. As in Fisher’s explanation, distress 
selling can be self-defeating, as when the asset market and distress selling feedback on each 
other. The fall in asset prices reinforces deflation via a negative wealth effect. This process 
can result in a recursive debt-deflation process. The Austrian theory to the contrary is not a 
theory of depression per se but rather a theory of the unsustainable boom. Austrians 
recognize that self-reversing changes in the capital structure may give way to a self-
aggravating downward spiral in both income and spending, which was described by Hayek as 
the “secondary depression (or deflation)”—in recognition of the fact that the primary 
problem was something else: the intertemporal misallocation of resources. (Hayek 1979, 40-
41; Garrison 2001, 75) While Austrians acknowledge the fact that a bad situation can get 
worse, they would generally argue that the self-aggravating downward spiral leading into 
deep depression is to be explained by significant government intervention on several levels 
thwarting market adjustment by constraining exchange opportunities.             
               In order to facilitate a critical evaluation of Minsky’s model, in the next section a 
stylized account of Minsky’s FIH will be presented. 
 
3. Minsky’s FIH versus Austrian Business Cycle Theory: Contrasting Explanations of 
Dynamic Unsustainability and the Upper Turning Point in Business Cycles 
 
             The two cornerstones of Minsky’s analysis are his “financial theory of investment” 
which considers the ways in which investment is financed, and the cumulative processes.(7) 
The core of Minsky’s analysis is a financial theory of investment according to which 
investment is essentially driven by: (i) the difference between the market price of capital 
goods in place and the current price of investments goods; (ii) the volume of internal finance. 
The expansion of the firm depends on its accumulation of capital out of current profits. (also 
Kalecki 1965 [2009], 92) As to the first factor, “(p)rices of capital assets depend upon 
current views of future profit (quasi-rent) flows and the current subjective value placed upon 
the insurance against uncertainty embodied in money or quick cash: these current views 
depend upon expectations that are held about the longer run development of the economy. 
The prices of current output are based upon current views of near term demand conditions 
and current knowledge of money wage rates. Thus the prices of current output (…) depend 
upon shorter run expectations. Capital-asset and current output prices are based upon 
expectations over quite different time horizons: capital output prices reflect long run 
expectations and current output prices reflect short term expectations.”(Minsky 1982, 94-5) 
As to the second factor, Minsky notes that the investment which can be debt financed today 
depends on the cash flows expected by both borrowers (firms) and lenders (banks) 
tomorrow. The higher the realized cash flow relative to debt commitments, the higher the 
rate of fulfillment of contracts, which positively affects the state of confidence of both 
bankers and business people and leads to a higher volume of investment being financed and 
carried out. 
             Minsky’s theory of investment determination can be illustrated with the help of 
Figure 1. The quantity of capital is measured on the x-axis and the “prices” of capital on the 
y-axis. Minsky draws a distinction between the supply price of investment goods—which we 
assume for simplicity to be equal to the average price level (P)—and the market price of 
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capital assets (V), which can be thought of as the present value of the stream of expected 
quasi rent per unit of capital. By assumption the latter coincides with the stock price. 
Investment can be financed in part by means of internally generated funds, which coincide 
with net worth (A) and in part by external finance. For a given price of newly produced 
capital goods (say P0) and a given level of internal finance (say A0) we can determine the 
maximum volume of investment which can be financed by means of internal funds K0=A0. 
By assumption, the quasi rent is increasing with the volume of net worth. Hence we can 
compute the market price V0 as an increasing function of A0. (Assenza et al. 2010, 185) If 
the firm chooses a level of investment greater than K0, it has to raise funds on the credit 
market. In this case banks have to be remunerated for the risk they assume (lender’s risk), so 
that the actual supply price of investment goods for the borrowing firm is higher than the 
price of newly produced capital goods P0. The schedule of the actual price of investment 
goods (P schedule), therefore, is flat at P0 until the maximum volume of internally financed 
investment K0 is reached and is increasing thereafter. Symmetrically, if the firm chooses a 
level of investment greater than K0, the risk of bankruptcy for the firm (borrower’s risk) 
increases and the expected quasi rent decreases so that the actual stock price is lower than the 
original one V0. The schedule of the actual market price of investment goods (V schedule), 
therefore, is flat at V0 until the maximum volume of internally financed investment K0 is 
reached and is decreasing thereafter. 
             The equilibrium volume of investment (K*) and the equilibrium price of investment 
goods (V*) are determined at the intersection of the upward sloping schedule representing 
the supply price of investment augmented by lender’s risk and the downward sloping 
schedule which describes the market price of capital goods augmented by borrower’s risk. 
Equilibrium investment depends upon the volume of internal finance and on the degree of 
borrower’s and lender’s risk which affect the slopes of the V and P schedules: K*=K(A0). An 
increase in the availability of internal funds from A0 to A1 brings about an outward shift of 
both the V and P schedules and an increase of investment as shown in figure 1. 
              The FIH is based on the distinction between hedge, speculative and Ponzi units; 
“(f)or hedge financing units, the cash flows from participation in income production are 
expected to exceed the contractual payments on outstanding debts in every period. For 
speculative financing units, the total expected cash flows from participation in income 
production when totaled over the foreseeable future exceed the total cash payments on 
outstanding debt, but the near term payment commitments exceed the near term cash flows 
from participation in income production, even though the net income portion of the near term 
cash flows (…) exceeds the near term interest payments on debt. A Ponzi finance unit is a 
speculative financing unit for which the income component of the near term cash flows falls 
short of the near term interest payments on debt so that for some time in the future the 
outstanding debt will grow due to interest on existing debt. Both speculative and Ponzi units 
can fulfill their payment commitments on debts only by borrowing (or disposing of assets). 
“(Minsky 1982, 22-3) In a ‘tranquil era’ both borrowers and lenders expect future cash flows 
to be more than enough to validate debt. Asset prices, which incorporate these expectations, 
increase relative to the price of current output, stimulating investments which in turn drive up 
output, profits and employment. Minsky’s cumulative processes, based on the 
interdependence between investment and profits, come into play. The interdependence 
between investment and profits becomes the basis of an upward spiral involving all the 
variables, with the exception of borrower and lender risks, which fall with expansionary 
effects on investment. The increasing debt is thus associated with decreasing safety margins. 
As the real sector grows, the financial system becomes more and more fragile. Banks are less 
cautious in extending credit and firms are less cautious in borrowing. As a consequence 
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hedge units, that is, borrowers who are able to service debt in each and every period of the 
time horizon of their financial contracts, become speculative units. Borrowers who were 
speculative units, in turn, become Ponzi units, that is, they have to borrow in order to service 
outstanding debt. As the proportion of hedge units in the population of borrowers decreases, 
financial fragility increases. In this heterogeneous agents’ setting, the increase of aggregate 
financial fragility during the expansion is due to the change of the structure of the economy, 
the weight of hedge units shrinking over time. When the perception spreads that in the 
aggregate cash flows do not validate debt any more, the network of financial relations 
collapses and a financial crisis sets in. (Assenza et al. ibid. 189)  When cash commitments on 
debt cannot be met, financial fragility becomes financial instability. (also Kregel 2013) 
               Minsky thus points to two drawbacks to the investment boom. First is its 
increasingly speculative nature. In the general euphoria, firms’ debt commitments increase 
faster than profits and eventually exceed them. Expecting a future bonanza, firms start 
financing their principal by resort to debt (speculative financing) and then even interest 
payments (ultra-speculative or Ponzi financing). Thus an initially robust financial system 
becomes fragile. In fact, an endogenous evolutionary process leads to a reduction of margins 
of safety, without any necessity for euphoria or excessive optimism: increasingly optimistic 
expectations of the ability to meet cash commitments in a cyclical expansion represent a 
rational reaction to the evaluation of past events, as expressed in higher probabilities of 
success. (Kregel 2008)  Second is that the persistence of the boom inevitably creates either 
bottlenecks in the financial system or inflationary pressures in the goods market that end up 
requiring a monetary restriction. In either case, the result is a rise in the rate of interest. (De 
Antoni ibid. 468-9) The higher interest rate ends the boom, and the investment-profit-
investment chain reverts to a downward spiral. More generally the inevitability of the upper 
turning point is explained in Minsky’s theory by pointing out that a crisis can occur if 
finance costs rise, if liquidity preference rises, or if income flows turn out to be less than 
expected. Endogenous processes tend to ensure that one of these (or all three) will, in fact, 
occur. (also Wray 1992, 167-8) 
 
Figure 1 
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                Minsky’s preoccupation with the upswing constitutes an important point of analogy 
between his theory of the business cycle and the Austrian theory.  The assumptions from 
which both theories proceed and the particular elements that have to be put together in order 
to allow for an explanation of the upper turning point are clearly different in both approaches, 
however. In particular, while any explicit reference to the Wicksellian framework is absent 
from Minsky’s conceptual approach, the Austrians clearly descend from the Wicksell 
Connection. As hinted at already, Leijonhufvud had made the simple but fundamental point 
that “the theory of the interest rate mechanism is the center of the confusion in modern 
macroeconomics.” (1981b, 131) In Wicksell’s theory of the cumulative process, the 
maladjustment of the interest rate—the discrepancy between the market rate and the natural 
rate—is the central idea. Use of the saving-investment approach to income fluctuations is 
predicated on the hypothesis that the interest rate mechanism fails to coordinate saving and 
investment decisions appropriately. (Leijonhufvud ibid. 132) The Austrian theory of the 
business cycle clearly shows how a lowering of the market rate of interest below the natural 
rate will set the economy on an unsustainable growth path. In particular the Austrian theory 
of the business cycle emerges from a straightforward comparison of savings-induced growth 
which is sustainable, with a credit-induced boom, which is not sustainable. Whereas saving 
entails genuine growth, credit expansion leads to boom and bust. The focus of the theory is 
the intertemporal discoordination—a general mismatch between intertemporal consumption 
and saving preferences and intertemporal production plans—and hence the inevitable crisis 
and downturn. The market is capable of allocating resources in conformity with intertemporal 
preferences on the basis of a market-determined (natural) rate of interest. It follows that an 
interest rate substantially influenced by extra-market forces will lead to an intertemporal 
misallocation of resources. Special attention is thus given to the extra-market forces that 
initiate the boom and the market’s own self-correcting forces that turn boom into bust. 
Whereas increased saving lowers the rate of interest and gives rise to a genuine boom, by 
contrast a falsified interest rate that mimics the loan market conditions of a genuine boom but 
is not accompanied by the requisite savings gives rise to an artificial boom, one whose 
artificiality is eventually revealed by the market’s reaction to excessively future-oriented 
production activities in conditions of insufficient saving. Misallocations are followed by 
reallocations. (Garrison 2001, 2005) 
 
4. Further Discussion: Analogies and Divergences 
 
4.a. Disaggregating the Business Cycle and Providing Macroeconomics with Adequate 
Micro-Foundations  
 
              There are both macroeconomic and microeconomic aspects to financial fragility. 
(Tymoigne and Wray 2014, 21-2) Both Minsky and the Austrians are sensitive to the 
requirement that macroeconomic theories should be provided with adequate micro-
foundations. In his doctoral dissertation Minsky had already emphasized “the need to relate 
aggregate analysis to the behavior of economic units.” (Minsky 2004, 17) In particular, the 
relation between investment and the behavior of individual firms is investigated. Without 
any doubt he thus intended to embrace a disaggregated approach to the study of business 
cycles. Minsky considered his approach in the dissertation to lay the micro-foundation for 
determining macro performance. The dissertation is a microeconomic analysis of firm 
behavior encompassing the various decision-making processes regarding entry, market 
structure, expansion, vulnerability and survival. (Papadimitriou 2004, x)  
              In Minsky’s theory of investment determination, all the determinants of investment 
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can be firm-specific. Moreover, although Minsky’s theory of investment determination can 
be formulated without explicit reference to heterogeneity, at a deeper and more significant 
level Minsky’s ideas can be properly expressed only in an heterogeneous agents’ setting 
considering the distinction among hedge, speculative and Ponzi units on which the FIH is 
based. Assenza et al. (2010) provide an example of a macroeconomic model in which firms 
are characterized by heterogeneous financial conditions at the firm level, thus implementing 
a disaggregated approach to the study of business cycles by looking at how the structure of 
the economy evolves over the course of the cycle. The role of heterogeneous financial 
conditions is the part of Minsky’s legacy that is thus becoming the cornerstone of a new 
research agenda. 
             Austrian theorizing has also been very sensitive to issues of excessive aggregation. 
Austrian economists have generally been critical of conventional macroeconomists’ primary 
focus on aggregate magnitudes and their abstracting from individual market participants and 
their interactions. The fundamental method of Austrian economic theory has been 
characterized as “methodological individualism”. Economic events can only be explained in 
terms of individual human actions, which means that the phenomena of the trade cycle are 
to be explained in terms of the responses of individuals in the system to price signals. 
(Hayek 1933 [2008]) Minsky, however, does not seem to consistently embrace 
methodological individualism. Although micro-founded, Minsky’s analysis must be 
interpreted more as a macro-foundation of microeconomics than vice versa. This means that 
his route has been macro-micro-macro: he starts from the determination of aggregate 
demand and total gross profits in the period, together with the liability structure inherited 
from the past; then he looks at the micro consequences of the current ratio of gross capital 
income and cash-payment commitments on individual choices about financing and 
investment; and finally he reconstructs the macro effects on the system’s evolutionary 
dynamics. (Bellofiore and Ferri 2001a, 24) Nor has Minsky’s approach been exempt from 
critique. Minsky implicitly assumes that the actual investment gearing ratio between 
external and internal financing aligns itself with the desired, thus rising pro-cyclically in the 
upswing and falling in the downswing. As investment increases, external financing grows 
faster than internal. As a consequence, the incidence of debt commitments on profits rises: 
finance becomes less hedge and more speculative. Minsky’s line of reasoning here is 
questionable, however. The good performance of the real sector (profits included) might 
strengthen rather than weaken the financial sector. (De Antoni ibid. 465) Minsky’s analysis 
apparently presents a missing link here since it does not provide any rationale to justify his 
rising leverage thesis at the macroeconomic level. (Lavoie and Seccareccia 2001, 84) 
               The attempts by post-Keynesian economists to disaggregate the business cycle 
along lines suggested by Minsky undeniably reflect a certain analogy with the Austrian 
approach. However, whereas Minsky develops the linkage of business investment with 
finance in the microeconomic sphere by extending the conventional neoclassical theory of 
the firm, Austrians base their unique macroeconomics on the concept of an inter-temporal 
structure of production and disaggregate the macro-economy by according a central role to 
the capital structure of the economy in the tradition of Menger (1871 [1994]) and Böhm-
Bawerk (1959). 
               To the extent both models relate to the same macroeconomic reality, however, it 
seems plausible to assume that some scope for integration of both disaggregation schemes 
may be found, both theoretically and empirically. Thus it seems plausible to suppose that 
the shift towards increased macroeconomic fragility over the course of the boom according 
to Minsky’s scheme will not occur “evenly” throughout the economy but rather 
“differentially” in ways that reflect the different stages of production according to the 
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Austrian disaggregation scheme. This is one area where future research may prove some 
fertile cross-fertilization or even partial theoretical integration between both approaches to 
be possible. 
 
4.b. Critique of Mainstream Equilibrium Theorizing and the Use of Equilibrium 
Concepts 
 
               Both Minsky and the Austrians have criticized variants of mainstream equilibrium 
theorizing. Austrians are methodologically at odds with neoclassical equilibrium theory. 
They eschew mathematical formalism, especially of the mechanistic type, preferring a 
historical narrative of events, reflecting their perception that events form part of dynamic 
processes that more often than not are out of equilibrium. (Simpson 2013, 135) The 
traditional Austrian theory of the cycle has also been characterized as profoundly 
deterministic: the arrival situation is a stationary equilibrium determined in a univocal 
manner on the basis of real variables (preferences, techniques and initial endowments of 
agents) and the ultimate cause of the cycle is purely monetary (bank policy). (Gloria-
Palermo 1999, 74) 
               However, while Minsky’s rejection of the “crutch” of equilibrium is total and 
uncompromising, the Austrian theory retains an equilibrium concept in an essential way. A 
tendency towards equilibrium is a key feature of the Austrian cycle. From the Austrian 
viewpoint, a proper but limited use of an equilibrium concept as a benchmark leads to a 
dynamic disequilibrium theory of a cycle. (Cochran and Glahe 1992, 1999) Hayek’s early 
work reflects a subtle tension between the perceived necessity of stating his case in a 
theoretically acceptable fashion, i.e., equilibrium theory, and a sense of that theory’s 
limitations. (Butos 1985) In Minsky’s view, to the contrary, the traditional re-equilibrating 
price mechanism is replaced by quantity mechanisms that exert cumulative effects on one 
another. After reaching their maximum development, the resulting tendencies wane and 
reverse. Advanced capitalist economies thus cyclically fluctuate in a permanent 
disequilibrium. (De Antoni ibid. 466)  
 
4.c. Price-theoretic aspects 
 
                Both Minsky and the Austrians have made attempts to provide their respective 
theories of the business cycle with price-theoretic foundations. The Austrian theory of the 
business cycle has a sound basis in price theory. The interest rate is a price; it is the price 
that strikes a balance between people’s eagerness to consume now and their willingness to 
save for the future. (Van den Hauwe 2009a)                                                                       
              Minsky is one of a small group of post-Keynesian economists who have insisted on 
the importance of the price-theoretic aspects of Keynes’ work, and who continued to try to 
develop this aspect of the Keynesian system. As has been explained, according to Minsky’s 
theory there are really two systems of prices in a capitalist economy – one for current output 
and the other for capital assets. When the price level of capital assets is high relative to the 
price level of current output, conditions are favorable for investment; when the price level 
of capital assets is low relative to the price level of current output, then conditions are not 
favorable for investment, and a recession—or a depression—is indicated. (Minsky 1986 
[2008]; also Kregel 1992, 87) The fundamental relative price in a capitalist economy is thus 
the relation between the price of capital assets and the price of current output. This two-
price model is the analytical tool by which Minsky integrates his theory of money and 
finance into his theory of investment.                                                                                                  
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                 While Minsky’s approach is thus still framed in terms of “price levels”, the logic 
of the Austrian theory is firmly anchored in the notion that the price system is a 
communications network. A miscommunication in the form of an interest rate held below 
its market or “natural” level by central-bank policy sets the economy off on a growth path 
that is inherently unsustainable. In a famous paper on “The use of knowledge in society” 
(Hayek 1945) Hayek summarized his view of the role of prices in market processes. 
Knowledge is not universally available. The great economic question is how to make the 
greatest social use of knowledge that is not universally available but exists only in dispersed 
form across the entire population. The “market“ is a decentralized solution to the 
fundamental problem of making use of widely dispersed knowledge. Thus the prices of 
resource inputs convey in a highly condensed form just enough information to make sure 
that the inputs are appropriately allocated, without any need for market participants to 
possess any detailed information about why certain price changes are occurring. Every 
market participant knows something, nobody knows everything. Institutions such as the 
price system, but also money and traditional rules of conduct, facilitate the coordination and 
effective use of this dispersed knowledge. In analogy with the famous incompleteness 
theorems of the mathematician and logician Kurt Gödel, any monocentric, top-down 
attempt to solve this coordination problem must necessarily remain incomplete and is 
doomed to fail. (van den Hauwe 2011b) These insights are no part of Minsky’s perspective. 
 
4.d. Monetary Aspects 
 
           Minsky’s work is best understood as a contribution to the general theory of money. 
In particular his work represents the most significant American contribution of his 
generation to the Banking School tradition of monetary thought that sees money arising as 
the natural byproduct of business finance. (Mehrling 1999, 150) The Austrian theory of 
boom and bust, despite its explicit focus on saving, investment, consumption, and 
production time, is equally, root and branch, a monetary theory. (Garrison 2001, 52) 
 
4.d.1. Inter-dependence of Real and Monetary Aspects 
 
                Economists commonly distinguish between monetary and non-monetary theories 
or explanations of the business cycle. Both Minsky’s theory and the Austrian theory can be 
characterized as belonging to the monetary approach to the explanation of business cycles 
in the sense that Minsky and the Austrians would agree that any adequate explanation of the 
business cycle will highlight both the monetary and the real factors involved.(8)  
According to Minsky business cycles are both monetary and real phenomena. (2004, xiv) 
The artificial separation between monetary and real phenomena is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis that the analysis of the determinants of investment is necessary for business 
cycle theory. On the Austrian side, according to Machlup’s well- known statement, “(t)he 
fundamental thesis of Hayek’s theory of the business cycle was that monetary factors cause 
the cycle but real phenomena constitute it.”(Machlup 1976, 23; also Hayek 1969 [1978])  
 
4.d.2. The Endogeneity of Money 
 
At the most general level, money endogeneity implies that the supply of money is not 
independent of demand. Often, however, the exogeneity-endogeneity distinction has referred 
to the ability of the central bank to control the money supply. Post-Keynesians do not accept 
money exogeneity, even in the control (or weak exogeneity) sense. Minsky’s approach to 
money implies an upward-sloping money supply curve and thus the acceptance of an 
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endogenously determined interest rate, in contrast to the “horizontalists” who argue that 
interest rates are exogenously set by the central bank. Generally Minsky’s approach 
emphasizes uncertainty, liquidity preference, profit-seeking behavior, and innovations in 
addition to central bank behavior. (also Wray 1992) Post-Keynesians have in particular 
emphasized the ability of financial institutions to economize on reserves and to innovate to 
escape attempts by the central bank to use quantity controls. These activities play a central 
role in Minsky’s FIH for they contribute to the transition from a robust financial system to a 
fragile one in which liquidity has become stretched. Innovations allow an existing quantity of 
high-powered money to support greater expenditures. This can be linked to an upward-
sloping velocity function: as interest rates rise, banks will expand credit in response to profit 
opportunities. Thus, any given quantity of money, narrowly defined, could permit more 
spending as credit is created. Furthermore, innovations can shift the velocity-interest rate 
function so that velocity might increase even without rising interest rates. 
              To recognize the endogeneity of money resurrects the Keynesian concept of 
liquidity preference as a central cause of the volatility of macroeconomic activity. According 
to Minsky, there exists a functional relation between the price of a particular or a 
representative capital or financial asset and the quantity of money. Normally the price of a 
capital asset is a rising function of the quantity of money, for as the quantity increases the 
value of the insurance in money decreases. As the price of money is always one, this implies 
that the price level of income-yielding capital assets increases. (Minsky 1986 [2008], 203) 
              In Minsky’s two-price- level model in the short run current output and capital-asset 
prices depend upon different market processes. Whereas wages and the current costs of 
producing output, and thus the offer prices of current output, move sluggishly, the prices of units 
in the stock of capital assets and, more directly, the price of equity shares traded on the 
exchanges can move rapidly. Thus the relation between the two price levels can change quite 
quickly: on the one hand a price level of current output which is in principle sluggish, on the 
other a price level of capital assets which is in principle volatile. (also Kregel 1992)  
              Austrians have in general been critical both of liquidity preference theory and of the 
monetary theory of the interest rate. Austrian economists question both the central place of 
liquidity preference in Keynes’s account of the business cycle and the legitimacy of the liquidity 
preference theory itself. According to Garrison, “(l)iquidity preference, which is sometimes seen 
as the sine qua non of Keynesianism, plays a secondary role—in term s of both causation and 
chronology—in Keynes’s account of the business cycle.” (ibid. 150) According to Rothbard, the 
Keynesian doctrine of liquidity preference suffers from the mathematical-economic sin of 
“mutual determination.” (Rothbard 1962 [2004], 785-92) Following Lachmann (1937 [1994]), 
Rothbard also points out that in the presence of an organized forward or futures market for 
securities, speculative bearishness would indeed cause at least a temporary rise in the rate of 
interest, but accompanied by no increase in the demand for cash. He concludes that “any 
attempted connection between liquidity preference, or demand for cash, and the rate of interest, 
falls to the ground.” (ibid. 792)  
               On the other hand Austrians and Keynesians seem to by and large agree on the 
endogeneity of money issue. According to Cochran and Glahe (1999, 75 fn) “Hayek’s view of 
the money supply process expressed in his discussion of endogenous versus 
exogenous theories is compatible with the Post-Keynesian theory of money.” Godley and 
Lavoie (2012, 127) write that “(t)here is a school of thought that has long been arguing in 
favour of endogenous money. This line of thought goes back to the writings of Thomas 
Tooke and the Banking School, and has been present in the history of economic thought ever 
since. It can be associated with the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell as well as several 
economists of the Austrian tradition, such as von Mises and Friedrich Hayek in the 1920s and 
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1930s.” 
               Hayek had criticized von Mises’s theory, however, as being exogenous. The von 
Mises cycle starts with a monetary injection initiated by the banking system; the market rate 
is decreased below the natural rate as banks extend additional loans. The cycle results from 
an active intervention into the market process. In the Hayekian model the cycle may start in 
this manner, but it may also start if banks fail to increase the market rate when the natural rate 
increases, in particular when investment demand increases and banks are confronted with an 
increased demand for funds. (Hayek 1933 [2008], 76; also Cochran and Glahe ibid. 75) 
 
4.d.3. The Non-Neutrality of Money 
 
               Minsky points out that the dominant microeconomic paradigm is an equilibrium 
construct in which initial endowments of agents, preference systems, and production 
relations, along with maximizing behavior, determine relative prices, outputs, and an 
allocation of outputs to agents. Money and financial interrelations are not relevant to the 
determination of these equilibrium variables. An implication of these constructs in the 
dominant microeconomics and the core of the dominant macroeconomics is that money and 
finance are neutral. In these dominant models money is a veil. (Minsky 1993, 77) Minsky 
disputes Friedman’s proposition that, although money and other institutions complicate the 
analysis, all the important characteristics of a modern capitalist economy are supposed to be 
contained in the simple model of the barter economy. (Minsky 1986 [2008], 129) 
                In the real financial capitalist world money is the key institution. It is endogenous, 
created during normal economic processes. Minsky emphasizes that, most importantly, 
money is created in the process of financing positions in assets. Banks increase the money 
supply whenever they share the belief of the borrower that positions in assets or financed 
activity will generate sufficient cash flows. If the future turns out to be worse than expected, 
it may be impossible to meet commitments. So money and nominal financial commitments 
matter. The conventional economic paradigm is thus not the only way economic 
interrelations can be modeled. Every capitalist economy can be described in terms of sets of 
interrelated balance sheets. At every reading of the balance sheet the financial instruments 
can be interpreted as generating two sets of time series: the liabilities generate payment 
commitments, and the assets generate expected cash receipts. Balance sheets relations link 
yesterdays, todays, and tomorrows: payment commitments entered in the past lead to cash 
payments that need to be executed now as well as future cash payments, even as liabilities are 
taken on now that commit future cash flows. In this structure the real and the financial 
dimensions of the economy are not separated: there is no so-called real economy whose 
behavior can be studied by abstracting from financial considerations. This system, linking 
yesterdays, todays, and tomorrows both financially and in terms of the demand for and 
supply of goods and services, is not a well-behaved linear system. Furthermore, the 
presumption that this system has an equilibrium cannot be sustained. This modeling of the 
economy leads to a process in time that generates a path that can fly off to deep depressions 
and open-ended inflations, even in the absence of exogenous shocks or strange 
displacements. In this model obviously money is never neutral. (ibid. 78) 
              Austrian insights concerning the non-neutrality of money derive from an entirely 
different strand of literature. Austrians are inclined to emphasize “Cantillon effects” of 
changes in the money supply, so called after Richard Cantillon (1755 [2001]) When new 
money enters the economy, perhaps as the result of gold discoveries under a gold standard, 
perhaps as the result of credit expansion under a fiduciary system, the new money does not 
penetrate all sectors of the economy at a uniform pace. The process does not work uniformly. 
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Changes in the money supply distort, at least transitionally, the pattern of relative prices and 
incomes and consequently distort the patterns of resource allocation and production. Such 
distortions form one reason why Austrians take a micro approach to theory and disdain 
theorizing in terms of aggregates and averages. (also Yeager 1988, 95) 
                 The Austrian viewpoint differs not only from the Post-Keynesian position but also 
from that of the monetarists who held the view, as the classics had done, that money is both 
neutral and super-neutral in the long run. (Smithin 2013, 47) As regards the impact of 
monetary stimulus, Austrians in this respect hold the position that money is non-neutral even 
in the long run. (Ravier, 2013) In a recent contribution Bilo and Wagner (2015) argue, 
however, that it is not necessary to reject the classical equilibrium condition; they set forth an 
alternative though not contradictory analytical framework whereby monetary processes can 
in the long run exert real economic effects. By redistributing resources, monetary processes 
influence the mix of entrepreneurial experiments that are injected into society. The two 
frameworks are non-commensurable rather than inconsistent. Whereas long-run non-
neutrality is a feature of movement through time—it is a historical fact—long-run neutrality 
is a necessary condition for systemic equilibrium outside of time—it is an analytical artifact.  
 
4.e. Capital-theoretic Aspects and the Role of the Credit Expansion Process 
 
In Minsky’s theoretical construction considerations relating to time and capital 
clearly play an important and essential role. He concluded his Stabilizing an Unstable 
Economy with the consideration that “(t)he essential Keynesian result, that capitalism is 
flawed mainly because it handles capital poorly, nowhere enlightens current policy actions 
(…)” and that “Keynes recognized the flaws in capitalism because he, more than his 
predecessors, contemporaries, and successors, understood the financial and time-related 
aspects of a capitalism that uses capital.” (Minsky 1986 [2008], 369)   
In the Austrian theory the critical time element manifests itself as an intertemporal 
capital structure or structure of production which is unique to Austrian macroeconomics: as 
envisioned early on by Menger (1871 [1994], 80-87) the economy’s production process is 
disaggregated into a number of temporally sequenced stages of production in order to allow 
for the output of the investment-goods sector and of the consumer-goods sector to move 
relative to one another and even to allow for differential movements within the investment-
goods sector. Replacing the single investment aggregate with temporally sequenced stages 
that make up the economy’s capital structure is what provides a basis for a substantive 
distinction between sustainable growth and unsustainable boom. 
In Minsky’s construction the essential feature of capitalism—capital accumulation—
is intimately tied to money creation. Money cannot be neutral precisely because its creation 
is “tied up with the process of creating and controlling capital assets….” (Minsky 1986 
[2008], 223) And the quantity of money cannot be exogenously determined as it is created as 
a result of private profit-seeking behavior. Money is created in the process of financing 
investment and forces the surplus which is necessary to allow capital formation. More 
fundamentally, credit creation is the means by which society ensures that the workers cannot 
purchase the total product. Credit creation gives purchasing power to entrepreneurs so they 
may finance capital accumulation. As Minsky argues, the markup in the consumption goods 
industry guarantees that workers in the investment goods industry can obtain consumption 
goods, while spending on investment goods generates a surplus over labor income. (Minsky 
1986 [2008], Chapter 7) The money thus created fulfills two other important functions: it 
serves as a medium of exchange, and it can be held as insurance against an uncertain future.  
Summarizing, in Minsky’s construction three elements seem essentially linked: 
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taking positions in assets; accepting liability structures; and money creation. It is important 
to note how this analysis differs essentially from the Austrian analysis. Money and credit 
created in the process of capital formation is what in the Austrian theory is designated as 
credit expansion. However, the Austrian analysis is built around the fundamental conceptual 
and theoretical distinction between capital accumulation, in the sense of making possible 
sustainable growth which presupposes and derives from genuine saving, and unsustainable 
growth, that is, boom and bust, which derive from credit expansion and which involve 
forced saving. This conceptual distinction is absent from Minsky’s theoretical framework.(9) 
             Actually Minsky seems to be arguing that capital accumulation necessarily, or at 
least usually and regularly, involves money and credit creation and thus what in the Austrian 
framework is characterized as forced saving. Austrians obviously object to the proposition 
that capital accumulation as the essential feature of capitalist economies is essentially and 
necessarily tied to credit expansion and money creation involving forced saving. Capital 
formation requires genuine saving. In this context Mises made the useful distinction between 
commodity credit and circulation credit. Commodity credit cannot be expanded. (Mises 
(1949 [1966], 433-4) As Mises argues, the boom actually generates capital consumption. As 
he wrote: “…it is very questionable whether forced saving can ever achieve more than to 
counterbalance a part of the capital consumption generated by the boom.” (ibid. 575-6) 
Moreover Austrian theory emphasizes aspects of capital that are neglected by other 
macroeconomic approaches, allowing for deeper insight and added explanatory power. 
Capital goods are non-homogenous, non-permanent, and either specific or non-specific; in 
particular capital goods are complementary. (Hayek 1937 [1939]; Lachmann 1956 [1978]; 
also Cochran and Glahe ibid. Chapter 8) 
            Summarizing, Minsky’s analysis and the Austrian analysis of the business cycle are 
superficially similar in that they both derive from an attempt to integrate monetary theory 
with capital theory. The introduction of a theory of heterogeneous capital and of a 
disaggregated intertemporal capital structure into the theoretical analysis of business cycle 
phenomena is unique to the Austrian approach, however. From the Austrian viewpoint, 
Minsky’s analysis, by neglecting the crucial distinction between capital investment backed 
by (an increase in) genuine saving and capital investment financed by money creation and 
credit expansion, ultimately misidentifies the fundamental cause of financial instability. 
 
4.f. Uncertainty, Animal Spirits, and the Role of the Institutional Context 
 
Minsky acknowledges the role and importance of Knightian uncertainty in 
explaining economic instability. According to Minsky the essential difference between 
Keynesian and both classical and neoclassical economics is the importance attached to 
uncertainty. (Minsky, 1982 128) Minsky agrees with Keynes that the future is essentially 
unknowable and beliefs regarding the future are highly subjective, and that in particular in 
abnormal times the economy will be driven up and down by baseless sentiments and waves 
of investor sentiment.  
Austrians generally recognize that whereas risk analysis, whether objective or 
subjective, is essentially a weighting of possibilities already known, genuine uncertainty 
allows for the unpredictable growth of these possibilities and thus for “gaps” in agents’ 
probability distributions. The source of uncertainty is endogenous in a world in real time. 
(O’Driscoll and Rizzo 1996, 64 ff. and Ch. 5) At first sight the views of post-Keynesians and 
Austrians about the meaning and role of uncertainty thus seem to converge. At a fundamental 
theoretical level, Ludwig von Mises’s views on probability were already closer to the spirit of 
Keynes’s philosophy of probability than to the frequency interpretation of his brother Richard 
von Mises. (Van den Hauwe 2011a) 
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              Both post-Keynesians and Austrians also stress the role and nature of institutions, in 
particular of bank and financial institutions, in economic processes. Minsky highlights the 
significance of banks and financial institutions as profit-seeking agents which react to perceived 
profit opportunities with financial innovations (and, so, stresses the endogeneity of the 
“effective” quantity of money and of the rate of interest). (Bellofiore and Ferri 2001b, 21) From 
the beginning, Minsky extended profit-seeking behavior from entrepreneurs and businessmen to 
bankers and financiers. On the Austrian side, Horwitz contends that “(w)hat the textbook model 
of the Classical economists misses is how money and the banking system work to ensure the 
valid insight behind Say’s Law (…)” (Horwitz 2000, 86) and that “Austrian analyses of 
competition as a discovery process, the Hayekian emphasis on prices and knowledge, and the 
focus on the central role played by institutions, have all affected the way economists outside the 
Austrian tradition are doing their work.” (ibid. 237) 
             As is explained further, however, a complete disagreement prevails between the two 
approaches as to the type or kind of institutions that would actually eliminate or at least 
mitigate the business cycle and macroeconomic instability. Whereas Austrians have made a 
case in favor of complete freedom of choice in currency and of a system of free banking, and 
have thus advocated the abolition of central banks, Minsky believes that Big Players can 
effectively stabilize the economy and has argued in favor of interventionism by in particular 
Big Bank and Big Government. Moreover this divergence can be explained by the fact that 
Minsky and the Austrians conceptualize in entirely different ways the relationship between 
the institutional context or environment and expectations and thus also between institutions 
and “the state of confidence” and fluctuations therein. In fact diametrically opposed positions 
are taken as regards the role of particular institutional contexts in generating (variations in) 
real-world uncertainty and the state of confidence. 
              There is a sense in which uncertainty is a universal aspect of human action to the 
extent that it is essentially inherent in action itself. (Mises 1949 [1966] 105) However, it is 
conceivable and in fact true that at least part of the uncertainties economic actors in the 
economy face do not have this necessary and universal character but can be related to the 
particular institutional context that is present. A certain level of uncertainty is then of a 
contingent character in the sense that it could conceivably be removed or reduced through 
institutional reform. Considerations of this sort apparently underlie Keynes’s well-known 
proposal for “a somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment”. (Keynes 1936 
[1997], 378) At the end of John Maynard Keynes (Minsky 2008) Minsky reminds us that 
Keynes “believed that both measures to raise the consumption function and the socialization 
of investment were necessary to sustain full employment and were desirable as social goals.” 
(ibid. 157) The decentralized decision making, which is the heart and soul of the market 
economy, adds a layer of uncertainty which restricts the economy to a level of performance 
that Keynes finds wanting and which therefore must be eliminated or at least severely 
restricted through centralization which alone can pave the way toward full employment.     
In this sense the central message of the General Theory too derives from comparative 
institutions analysis and not from the analysis of cyclical fluctuations. (also Garrison 2001, 
180 ff.) 
             Contemporary research in behavioral macroeconomics identifies animal spirits, 
defined by Keynes (1936 [1997]) as waves of optimism and pessimism of investors that 
have a self-fulfilling property, as an important independent and essentially unpredictable 
factor driving the movements of investment and output and shaping business cycle 
fluctuations. These waves of optimism and pessimism can be understood to be learning 
mechanisms of agents who do not fully understand the underlying model but are continually 
searching for the truth. (De Grauwe 2012) As is explained further, the theory of Big Players 
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goes beyond this way of modeling the role of uncertainty by recognizing that an appeal to 
swings in investor optimism/pessimism or “animal spirits” is not wrong, but that it merely 
pushes the question back one stage: What explains the swings in investor enthusiasm? 
(White 2015, 110) From this perspective the explanatory strength of confidence theories—
such as Minsky’s--is weak.  
             Austrians have acknowledged the link between institutional context and the nature 
of expectations but their conclusions are virtually opposite to those of post-Keynesians. Big 
Players (Koppl 2002; Prychitko 2010) and the related concept of regime uncertainty (Higgs 
1997) —or uncertainty about the rules of the game—both artificially reduce the state of 
confidence by corrupting the expectations of financial intermediaries and businesses in the 
real economy. As long as Big Player influence and regime uncertainty persist confidence 
will be low; both have the potential to create a permanent slump. The low state of 
confidence they create is not self-correcting. (Koppl 2014) 
             The process by which individual knowledge is changed is influenced by institutions 
and in this sense expectations depend on institutions. (Koppl 2002)  Expectations will be 
more prescient in some institutional environments than in others. Adopting a Hayekian 
evolutionary stance, Butos and Koppl (1993) draw our attention to the filtering conditions of 
stability and atomicity. The failure of either condition creates a loose “system constraint” and 
thus a loose link between environment and expectations. If the market includes actors who 
are more or less immune from the competitive pressures of profit and loss, then the natural 
selection of rules will be inoperative with regard to these actors and the system constraint 
facing them will be loose. In such cases the privileged actors are free to act idiosyncratically. 
(ibid. 321) Lack of stability or atomism produces ignorance and uncertainty. In the presence 
of Big Players economic expectations tend to become less reliable. A stable economic 
environment with atomistic competition, to the contrary, tends to produce rational outcomes 
and prescient expectations. Minsky is an advocate par excellence of an eminent role for Big 
Players in the economy. (10) 
              Summarizing, Austrians point out that Keynesian policies, and in particular the 
interventions of Big Players, tend to create and enhance the irregular ups and downs that 
Keynes attributed to modern capitalism as such. In this sense, Keynesian policies tend to 
create a Keynesian economy. This conclusion is also compatible with long-established 
conclusions of the so-called Socialist Calculation Debate. (Huerta de Soto 2010) In the 
domain of money and banking Austrians have generally advocated the abolition of central 
banks and a move towards free (or decentralized) banking, despite some ongoing debates 
about how exactly free banking is to be defined.  
 
5. Interpreting Recent Historical Evidence: Minsky and the Austrians on the 
Global Financial Crisis (11) 
 
A case can be made that the global financial crisis was foreseeable and avoidable. It 
did not “just happen”. (FCIC 2011) Tymoigne and Wray (2014) argue that Minsky’s 
framework helps us to understand what has happened over the past half century instead of 
merely explaining the recent boom and crisis. They explain how capitalism in developed 
countries progressively moved from a more stable form of capitalism that Minsky called 
Managerial Capitalism to a more unstable form called Money Manager Capitalism. The 
1980s S&L crisis put the final nail in the coffin of Managerial Capitalism as the system 
moved to Money Manager Capitalism (MMC). MMC is characterized by the rise of a 
predatory state, the disengagement of the government, the return of a pro-market mentality, 
and a growing role of financial markets in determining economic outcomes. Two main 
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factors contributed to the Great Recession: pro-market policies and the decline in 
underwriting standards on loans and securities. Both contributed to the growth of 
indebtedness in the private sector and to the change in the quality of this indebtedness for the 
worse. This change in quality manifested itself primarily through a move toward collateral-
based lending, i.e., lending based on growing asset prices instead of income. These authors 
conclude that the two main lessons we should have learned (but probably did not) from the 
GFC is that the Great Recession did not happen by accident and that the GFC was not a 
“liquidity crisis” but a solvency crisis. 
              While Austrians might agree with certain descriptive elements contained in this 
narrative, they would certainly sharply dispute the thesis that the Great Recession was a 
consequence of pro-market policies. Indeed the Austrians, in general agreement with their 
pro-free-market philosophy, have in particular emphasized and highlighted (1) the role of the 
Fed in engineering excessive money and credit creation (Fillieule 2010, 179-80; Huerta de 
Soto 2011; Posner 2011; Salin 2010; Taylor 2009, 2011) and (2) the perverse incentive 
effects of disastrous regulations. (Friedman and Kraus 2011) 
             Concerning the first point, experimental evidence seems to provide some 
corroboration regarding the role of liquidity in asset bubbles. Gjerstad and Smith (2014) do 
not explicitly refer to the Austrian theory of the business cycle but several of their findings 
seem compatible with an interpretation in such terms. Experimental research demonstrates 
the key proposition that not all markets are created equal: whereas commodity-flow markets 
tend to converge quickly, prices in asset-trading markets typically deviate substantially from 
those predicted by the rational expectations market model. (also Smith et al. 1988) People in 
laboratory asset-market experiments, as well as their “sophisticated” counterparts in 
economies today, become entangled in self-sustaining expectations of escalating prices. One 
of the important parallels in behavior between experimental price bubbles and those in the 
housing market is that, as in the laboratory, money matters: the availability and aggressive 
marketing of mortgage credit supported the housing bubble until credit started to be 
withdrawn. (ibid. 269-70) The observation that prices can be sustained longer and more 
vigorously if momentum investors have more liquidity is consistent with experimental 
findings. More money makes for bigger bubbles. A significant and sustained change in 
monetary policy beginning in 2001 is potentially implicated in strengthening and imparting 
longer life to the mortgage market growth that fueled the housing price bubble. (ibid. 166-7) 
              Concerning the second point, the historical situation that has resulted from 
regulatory issues, financial innovation and their interaction is in fact extremely complex. 
Kregel (2008) analyzes the cushion of safety in asset securitization and in collateralized 
subprime mortgage obligations, also considering the role of “special purpose entities” 
(SPEs), and concludes that the crisis was not the result of a traditional endogenous Minsky 
process in which narrowing margins of safety lead to fragility, but rather a structural result of 
how creditworthiness is assessed in the new “originate and distribute” financial system 
sanctioned by the modernization of financial services.  
              On the one hand a tendency has prevailed to demonize structured finance and to 
consider its use as a scapegoat and as the culprit of problems in the financial markets. (see 
e.g. Greenberger, 2013) On the other hand a closer examination of the role of incentives 
resulting from a particular set of regulations suggests that while structured finance itself is 
not bad, it was certainly possible to use it badly. (Murphy 2009, 221)  From this perspective 
structured finance is merely a tool, an instrument that can make credit cheaper by allocating 
it more efficiently. Rather it is the role of incentives that encouraged banks to move risk to 
insurance companies, ABCP investors, and other investors that caused the problems. 
             The role of incentives is explicitly considered in Friedman and Kraus (2011); these 
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authors embrace the regulatory failure thesis. In particular they debunk various elements of 
the conventional wisdom about what caused the financial crisis and argue that the crisis was 
a regulatory failure in which the prime culprit was the set of regulations governing banks’ 
capital levels known as the Basel rules. Theirs is an “incentives story” but it is not a moral-
hazard story. They stress the role of radical ignorance on all sides. The triple-A ratings on 
MBS were conferred by three bond-rating corporations that had been protected from 
competition by Securities and Exchange Commission regulation dating back to 1975. Not 
only bankers but investors of all kinds were either unaware that these three corporations 
were protected, or they were unaware of the implications of this protection for the accuracy 
of their ratings. This lack of awareness was apparently shared by the banking regulators, who 
had incorporated the three companies’ ratings into the Recourse Rule and Basel II. The 
financial crisis was transmitted into the nonfinancial or “real” economy through a lending 
contraction that began in mid-2007, as banks were required to “mark to market” their 
holdings of mortgage-backed securities in line with market fears about the value of these 
securities, due to rising rates of subprime mortgage delinquencies.(12) 
                  Both sides have thus produced a number of analyses but no comprehensive 
synthesis seems to be available at this time. This is another area where some scope for cross-
fertilization between both approaches may exist and will possibly be exploited by future 
research. 
 
6. Policy Implications 
 
To Keynes’s argument that the two outstanding faults of capitalism are its arbitrary 
and inequitable distribution of income and unemployment—and for which he proposed an 
employer-of-last-resort (ELR) policy as a solution—Minsky added a third: a financially 
complex capitalist economy will tend to generate instability. (Wray 2013)  
Minsky’s reform proposals are multifaceted and somewhat eclectic. In the financial 
sphere he was in favor of smaller banks; in order to support decentralization and a return to 
more relationship-oriented banking he proposed the creation of a system of community 
development banks. He also favored measures to improve underwriting, direct credit 
controls, enhancing bank evaluations through greater use of the discount window, and 
macroprudential regulation. He rejected the old mainstream view that the central bank can 
constrain bank activity by rationing reserves. He wanted to favor small firms over big 
corporations and advocated elimination of the corporate profits tax. As a student at Chicago 
he had been exposed to the 100 percent money proposal and he was favorably disposed 
toward these ideas.  
His views about the role of Big Players in the economy remain most incongruent 
with the Austrian vision, however. 
          Minsky’s theory of money supply endogeneity leads clearly to the conclusion that 
monetary growth policies are not effective at controlling financial market forces and are 
particularly inefficient in controlling the thrust toward speculative finance. Minsky argues 
that two other policy instruments--federal government deficit spending and lender-of-last-
resort interventions by the Federal Reserve--are extremely effective, if not at achieving full 
employment, at least in limiting the downside variability of incomes and liquidity during 
economic downturns, particularly in periods of incipient financial crisis.  
              It is important to see that in Minsky’s “two price” view of the world, two stabilizers are 
indeed needed: Big Government (BG) and a Big Bank (BB). Drawing from Kalecki’s well-
known accounting identity that, in a closed economy, profits equal investment plus the 
government deficit, Minsky argues that the effect of deficit spending during a downturn is to 
establish a floor for profits.(Minsky 1986[2008]; 1982) Big Government spending can thus 
19 
 
partially offset the fall in profit flows which results from a fall-off in investment or 
overoptimistic expectations, and in this way, provides support for consumption goods prices. 
But it cannot directly support the fall in the value of a bank’s assets which results from a fall in 
capital goods prices. This is why Big Government, by itself, is not enough to counter instability. 
A Big Bank must come in to stabilize the prices of capital assets by counteracting the liquidity 
shortages of distressed financial firms. Because of the powerful effects of these policies, Minsky 
believed firmly that another large-scale debt deflation and depression, such as occurred in the 
1930s, could, at least in principle, be prevented from happening again. 
               In this scenario, deficit spending and lender-of-last-resort interventions, and the 
potential costs associated with risky financial practices are, to a considerable extent, 
socialized since government rather than firms absorbs these costs. The socialization of 
financial market risk promotes fragility since, as Minsky acknowledged, once borrowers 
and lenders recognize that the downside instability of profits has decreased, there will be an 
increase in the willingness and ability of business and bankers to debt finance. If the cash 
flows to validate debt are virtually guaranteed by the profit implications of big government, 
then debt-financing of positions in capital assets is encouraged. (Minsky 1986 [2008]) 
              From the Austrian viewpoint, cyclical and financial instability are not inherent in 
purely capitalist free-market economies but are essentially phenomena of mixed economies. 
(Ikeda 1997) Austrians can question the adequacy of Minsky’s identification of the relevant 
institutional context. The instability of capitalist economies that has been observed in 
history is actually and invariably the instability of a mixed system. At the theoretical level 
this circumstance may still seem to leave open the answer to the question of whether 
financial instability is conceivably inherent in free market economies or whether it is 
actually a consequence of government intervention. Austrians generally argue, however, 
that the business cycle is actually generated by public authorities’ interventions in market 
processes. (Hayek 1979) In particular the observed instability in current-day banking 
regimes is not prima facie evidence for the hypothesis that a banking system makes itself 
fragile. Current-day systems are characterized by central banks and other government 
agencies with power to disrupt the system. (White 2015, 110) 
               Austrians therefore have generally deplored the movement towards command and 
control which they believe is a mistake that threatens the wealth and welfare of the people. 
Instead we need to restore the rule of law and economic liberalism. (Koppl 2014) In other 
words, in order to significantly reduce regime uncertainty and Big Player influence we need 
to take the “constitutional turn” (13). Such an economic constitution would have to comprise: 
(a) Fiscal discipline since when government revenues are big enough, uncertainty over the 
tax bill becomes destructive regime uncertainty and a drag on output (14); (b) A monetary 
constitution since only if current austerity is combined with sensible reforms to create a 
sound monetary constitution will the likelihood of future debt crises be reduced (15); (c) A 
regulatory constitution since without real regulatory reform there is little hope to escape 
crony capitalism that increases the role of Big Players; we should regulate the regulators in 
the same way that markets regulate private firms. (Koppl 2014) 
                As regards the monetary dimension, in the context of a central banking regime, 
Selgin (1997) has advocated the productivity norm as the alternative to zero (or positive) 
inflation. (16) Huerta de Soto (2012, 736) goes beyond a proposal for an alternative monetary 
rule for central bank behavior and argues that in order to establish a truly stable financial and 
monetary system for the twenty-first century, a system which protects our economies as far as 
possible from crisis and recessions, the following will be necessary: (1) complete freedom of 
choice in currency; (2) a system of free banking, and the abolition of the central bank; and 
most importantly, (3) obligatory observance of traditional legal rules and principles by all 
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agents involved in the free banking system, particularly the important principle according to 
which no one may enjoy the privilege of loaning something entrusted to him on demand 
deposit. In short it is necessary to maintain at all times a banking system which includes a 
100-percent reserve requirement. Huerta de Soto’s definition of free banking is not shared, 
however, by authors who advocate a fractional- reserve free banking system as an alternative 
to central banking. (Selgin 1988) Although the proposal for fractional-reserve free banking is 
fraught with conceptual problems (Van den Hauwe 2009b), the debate between the two 
factions can be expected to go on. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
               Although Minsky’s interpretation of Keynes’s macroeconomics and essential 
message clashes with authoritative alternative interpretations, it has become increasingly 
influential in the years following the GFC and further research along the lines suggested by 
Minsky can be expected to be forthcoming in coming years. Some of the analogies and/or 
similarities of his theoretical analysis with the analysis provided by the Austrian School 
suggest a more than merely superficial affinity between both theoretical approaches and some 
scope for cross-fertilization between or even partial theoretical integration of both research 
traditions can be found that may be further evidenced by forthcoming work relating to 
business cycle theory and to the role of financial innovation and regulation. Nevertheless, 
both in terms of fundamental causality and in terms of policy conclusions and prescriptions, 
both approaches remain incompatible at a fundamental level and difficult if not impossible to 
reconcile.   
               Much of the disagreement on policy issues between post-Keynesians and Austrians 
hinges on the answer to the underlying question of whether the actions and interventions of 
Big Players in mixed economies are stabilizing or destabilizing. Post-Keynesians believe they 
can and, if conducted appropriately, often will indeed be stabilizing; Austrians to the contrary 
believe that mostly they will tend to be destabilizing. Minsky’s policy conclusions manifest a 
lack of familiarity with the conclusions of the Austrian analysis of the problems of central 
planning by Big Players such as Big Bank and Big Government. 
              Even if the two theoretical frameworks do not directly contradict each other since 
they are actually non-commensurable, the Austro-Wicksellian paradigm arguably provides 
superior insights that can complement and correct Minskyan analyses of the historical 
experience of the GFC and Great Recession. 
 
Notes 
 
(1) The GFC is now treated in most orthodox macroeconomics textbooks from the 
perspective of the conventional IS-LM and AD-AS frameworks and the information 
contained therein is often useful. See e.g. Blanchard et al. (2010); Gordon (2012); Mishkin 
(2013), Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2010). In this paper I will consider two heterodox 
approaches to interpreting the GFC, its causes, consequences and policy implications. In 
particular the heterodox approach of the late Hyman Minsky had become prominent in terms 
of influence and prestige among interpreters of the GFC that began in 2007-8. I will here 
adopt a critical perspective with respect to Minsky’s approach from the standpoint of 
Austrian economics. It is not difficult to document the growing influence of Minsky’s 
economics since the Global Financial Crisis. Clearly the mainstream has discovered Minsky 
(Wray 2016, 8 ff.). See also: Bhattacharya et al. (2011); D’Apice and Ferri (2010); 
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012); Flanders (2015); Rosser at al. (2012). Richard C. Koo, in 
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his much acclaimed (2015), cites Minsky as one among very few economists who have 
seriously addressed the problem of asset bubbles. Since most readers of this journal will be 
familiar with the Austrian theory of the business cycle, I will not present an elaborate account 
of its basic features. Reference can be made to, among others, Garrison (2001; 2005) and 
Huerta de Soto (2012). The relevant works of Mises and Hayek, as explained and discussed 
in Huerta de Soto (2012), remain required reading. 
(2) In very general terms Minsky followed Marx but, as explained further, it is not a 
realization crisis that is the outcome of this process but rather a validation crisis in which the 
commitments on financial liabilities can no longer be met from current income. (also Kregel 
2013) 
(3) See e.g. Vikram Mansharamani who writes that “(t)he Austrian business cycle theory is 
similar in many respects to Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis.” (2011, 36)  
(4) The motivation or rationale for such an exercise may seem weak but this impression is 
mistaken. Austrian economists may remember how Hayek finally regretted never having 
reviewed Keynes’ General Theory; they should not now neglect paying due attention to 
Minsky’s increasingly influential work. On Hayek versus Keynes, see also Backhouse 
(2014).                                                                                      
(5) Generally, the Wicksellian connection consists of three primary and tightly interrelated 
themes. The first is that money matters. The core of the Wicksell Connection, in contrast to 
all approaches of Walrasian descent, consists in the integration of real with monetary 
analysis. This ingredient is intimately related to the second element of the Wicksell 
Connection, namely, the identification of intertemporal coordination as the central problem in 
macroeconomics. The Wicksellian economy is one that gives full scope to potential 
coordination failures, with the “dark forces of time and ignorance”, poised always to disrupt 
the coincidence of saving and investment. The third and final theme constituting the Wicksell 
Connection relates to the fact that the problem of intertemporal coordination of economic 
activity is inextricably bound up with questions concerning the dispersion, acquisition, and 
distribution of information and knowledge. See also Leijonhufvud (1981a, 131-202). 
Leijonhufvud (1981b, 133) had proposed a grouping of macroeconomic theorists along two 
separate traditions labeled “Saving-Investment Theories” and “Quantity Theory.” Keynes is 
categorized by Leijonhufvud as a Wicksellian. This categorization had been questioned and 
rejected by Garrison (1992, 144). Minsky’s own interpretation of Keynes differs markedly 
both from that of Garrison and from that of Leijonhufvud.                                                                                  
(6) The reader will look in vain for a single reference to Wicksell in Minsky’s three books. 
Detzer and Herr (2015, 115) argue, in contrast, that Minsky followed the Wicksellian 
approach.                                                                                                                                    
(7) In this section I will provide a summary statement of Minsky’s analysis of financial 
fragility and instability. The post-Keynesian literature contains several excellent summaries 
which I have used freely, besides Minsky’s three books. See in particular: Assenza et al. 
2010; Bellofiore and Ferri 2001a and 2001c; De Antoni 2010; Fazzari and Papadimitriou 
1992; Kregel 2013; Mehrling 1999; Papadimitriou and Wray 2010; Wray 2016; among 
others.  
(8) In contrast money has no role in, e.g., real business cycle theory (RBC). According to the 
RBC theory, exogenous fluctuations in the level of total factor productivity make steady 
reallocations of the factors of production necessary in order to maintain an efficient economic 
allocation. Observed business fluctuations are explained as the efficient outcome of the 
interaction between agents’ maximizing behavior. (Arnold 2002) Real business cycle theory 
is thus an example of a non-monetary theory of the business cycle. The theory attributes 
business cycles to real or supply shocks, such as changes in technology. (Rabin 2004)  
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(9) It will be remembered here that early on Austrians had been confronted with Sraffa’s  
critique of this very distinction. See Sraffa (1932 [1995]). 
(10) A Big Player has three defining characteristics. The player is big in the sense that its 
actions influence the market under study; it is insensitive to the discipline of profit and loss; 
and it is arbitrary in the sense that its actions are based on discretion rather than any set of 
rules. (Koppl 2014, 97) An activist central bank is a representative Big Player—it can be 
large, it is protected and its actions will be unpredictable.  
(11) Post-Keynesians working in the tradition of Minsky as well as Austrians have actively 
participated in debates relating to the historical context provided by the GFC and subsequent 
Great Recession. Several collections of papers have been published. Reference can be made 
to, among others, Dejuán et al. (2011), Kates (2010 and 2011), and some of the papers in 
Page West III and Whaples (2013). Mention should also be made of Beckworth (2012); 
Booth (2009); Friedman (2011); Hein, Detzer and Dodig (2015); Wolfson and Epstein 
(2013). Howden (2011) offers a European perspective.  
(12) On the role of bank-capital regulations (or so-called “Basel accords”) see in particular 
also V. V. Acharya and M. Richardson (2011) and J. Jablecki and M. Machaj (2001). Also, 
but in a different sense, Sinn (2010). On the controversial role of credit-default swaps in the 
crisis, see P. J. Wallison (2011). On the role of the credit-rating agencies, see L. J. White 
(2011). Minsky (1987) was a prescient piece about securitization. 
(13) On constitutional economics in general, see Van den Hauwe (2005);  
(14) For a concrete proposal, see Buchanan and Wagner (1977 [2000]);  
(15) On reforming government’s role in the monetary system, see White et al. (2015). See 
also T. Polleit and M. von Prollius (2010) and the papers in P. Altmiks (Hg.) (2010). 
(16) Under a productivity norm, changes in velocity would be prevented (as under zero 
inflation) from influencing the price level through offsetting adjustments in the supply of 
money. But adverse “supply shocks” like wars and harvest failures would be allowed to 
manifest themselves in higher output prices, while permanent improvements in productivity 
would be allowed to lower prices permanently. (ibid. 10)                                                       
 
Dr. Ludwig Van Den Hauwe 
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